Introduction
The present paper is the first to use direct measures of market potential for inventions to assess two primary features of rational economic models, profit-seeking and risk aversion, among inventor-entrepreneurs. As elucidated by for example Jewkes, Sawers, and Stillerman (1959) and Baumol (1968) , the most important inventions have stemmed most often from individual inventors and from autonomous individuals at institutions including universities. So there is good reason to care about the motivations and successes of entrepreneurs, and particularly of independent inventors. While a growing theoretical literature addresses the optimal behavior of entrepreneurs and inventors, direct empirical measures of entrepreneurial opportunities and resulting behavior have been lacking. Several studies use indirect empirical tests and find aggregate evidence of profit seeking behavior, but without direct measures of characteristics of entrepreneurs' business opportunities (Bernhardt, 1994; Shane, 2001; Friedman and Silberman, 2003; Lach and Schankerman, 2004; Link and Siegel, 2005) .
In addition, some recent studies seem to show economically nonsensical behavior by entrepreneurs. It has been found that a majority of people who enter entrepreneurship (75%) are better off staying employed (Bernhardt 1994; Hamilton 2000) , that entrepreneurs invest too much in their own businesses considering the risk and return (Moskowitz and VissingJorgensen, 2002) , and that entrepreneurs expect better financial outcomes than employed persons but experience worse realizations (Arabsheibani et al., 2000) . Furthermore, 97% of inventors are better off not inventing (Åstebro, 2003) and a considerable fraction continues investing money in their inventions after being credibly informed that the invention has no economic value (Åstebro, Jeffrey and Adomdza, 2007) . Inventors credibly advised that it is not worthwhile to commercialize their inventions sometimes did so anyway, with optimists spending 166% more than pessimists (Åstebro, 2003; Åstebro, Jeffrey and Adomdza, 2007) .
Such nonsensical behavior is particularly troubling given the importance of inventorentrepreneurs to the economy. To explain these aberrations, economists assume that entrepreneurs are wishful thinkers (e.g., de Meza 2002) , risk-seekers (e.g., Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979; Kanbur, 1979) , largely motivated by non-pecuniary benefits (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Hamilton, 2000; Benz and Frey, 2008; Baumol, 2006) , or "skewness lovers" (Åstebro, 2003) . Indeed, experiments show that excess entry of entrepreneurs documented for example by Hamilton (2000) and Åstebro (2003) apparently arises from several decisionmaking biases such as overconfidence and optimism (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; Coelho, de Meza and Reyniers, 2004; Hoelzl and Rustichini, 2005; Moore and Cain, 2007) . Should such biases and non-pecuniary motivations be pervasive, policies to encourage innovation may be ineffective or even misguided. For example, there would be no reason to encourage entry if there is widespread overoptimism (de Meza, 2002) . From a policy perspective it is therefore important to establish whether entrepreneurs, and especially independent inventors, respond sensibly to economic motives, or if their behavior is dominated by overconfidence, pleasure in risk, optimism, or (Baumol, 2006 ) the second currency of joy in the task of invention. This is our starting point for this paper.
To probe whether inventor-entrepreneurs' decisions match two central tenets of rational economic models, profit-seeking and risk aversion, this paper uses direct measures not only of individual inventors' decisions but also, for the first time, of economic characteristics of their business opportunities. The data are professional a priori assessments by an independent agency charging a substantial fee for the assessment. Two limitations of the data are that they involve rankings rather than exact numerical values, and that they are representative only of the subset of independent inventors who paid the Canadian Innovation Center (CIC) to review the prospects for their inventions and to advise on commercialization. These limitations notwithstanding, the measures seem a satisfactory means to move forward given that previous studies have used only indirect measures (and had other data limitations and subpopulations).
The data pertain only to independent inventors, who are not subject to established firms' institutional decision-making biases (cf., Henderson, 1993) . The data further pertain to ideas at an early stage of development for which there remain significant development and commercialization decisions and efforts. Inventors who chose not to use the CIC's services predominantly did so, CIC analyses indicate, because they decided their inventions were of insufficient quality to motivate the assessment fee suggesting that our sample is truncated from below. Extremely optimistic or overconfident inventors or those with clear opportunities as well likely would not use the service as it would have no impact on their decision-making. We followed up these data to assess, for one thousand and twelve inventors, entry and exit from commercial production.
To guide the empirical analysis, we use a rational profit-seeking model involving uncertainty. Our model assumes that inventors respond to expected profitability of market opportunities, including sunk costs of entry and uncertainty. Sensitivity to uncertainty gauges whether entrepreneurs are risk-averse or risk-seeking.
We find that pecuniary incentives alter inventors' entry (commercialization) and exit (cessation of sales) decisions. The probability of entry rises significantly with greater expected sales, and falls significantly with greater expected manufacturing costs, competition from imitators, and development uncertainty. For exit, the estimated coefficients, while mostly statistically insignificant for theoretical and statistical power reasons, are likewise consistent with profit-seeking decisions. The entry and exit decisions observed are inconsistent with riskseeking behavior and with overconfidence that makes inventors expect high returns in highuncertainty situations, and are consistent with risk aversion. Entrepreneurial entry and exit seemingly can be explained, at least in part, by profit-seeking and risk-averse behavior.
Model and Hypotheses
We present a simple empirically-relevant model embodying the most obvious economic components -those for which we have data -of an inventor's investment decision. The model pertains to inventors (and their financiers) who face a decision whether to invest in bringing an invention to market, and then whether to remain in production or exit the market. The model allows for differences in inventors and their inventions, and for unpredictability in the development process and in the eventual markets for inventions.
The model is kept tractable by two key simplifying assumptions. Dynamics over time after entry, as in models such as Jovanovic (1982) , are not formally analyzed. Instead we model market conditions as constant. Uncertainty is modeled through two representative variables -the ones for which we have measures. The portrayal of sunk cost and market size as random allows us to explore effects of randomness at both development and production stages.
Model
An inventor i can pay sunk cost i S to commercialize an invention. Hence inventors' response to risk depends on whether the inventors are risk-averse or risk-seeking, and whether the risk pertains to a sunk cost versus a post-entry activity from which they can exit:
P5. If inventors are risk-averse (risk-seeking), greater development uncertainty is associated with reduced (increased) probability of entry.
P6.
If inventors are risk-averse, greater demand uncertainty may decrease or increase the probability of entry. If inventors are risk-seeking, greater demand uncertainty unambiguously increases the probability of entry.
Inventors' self-selection for entry on the basis of risk and sunk cost has ramifications for exit.
Unambiguous ramifications for exit arise only for sunk cost and associated risk.
Expected sunk cost reduces expected utility, so an inventor with greater expected sunk cost requires a better opportunity in other ways to have sufficient expected utility to enter. After entering and paying the sunk cost, only the other benefits of the opportunity affect profit. Selfselection thus ensures that inventors with higher expected sunk cost are less likely to exit once they are producing their innovations:
P7. Greater expected sunk cost is associated with reduced probability and rate of exit.
5
Risk in sunk cost has a similar effect to expected sunk cost, for identical reasons. Risk-averse inventors facing high uncertainty enter only if the opportunity is better in other ways, yielding a lower probability of exit among those inventors who enter. Risk-seeking inventors self-select in reverse. Hence:
P8.
If inventors are risk-averse (risk-seeking), greater development uncertainty is associated with reduced (increased) probability and rate of exit.
Only for these two variables is the effect on exit unambiguous.
For other variables, the most that can be said is that typically worse values ought to have a nonnegative but near zero effect on exit. The effect is near zero; this is partly because a worse value reduces profit and so increases the probability of exit, but also means that the inventor had reasonably good values of other traits in order to enter and so decreases the probability of exit, with the former effect typically larger. (Demand uncertainty has especially complex effects and is not addressed.) Hence:
P9. Greater manufacturing cost (fixed and per unit) and competition most likely have nonnegative (but near zero) effects on the probability and rate of exit, while greater price and expected output most likely have nonpositive (but near zero) effects on the probability and rate of exit.
These tendencies are likely to hold for plausible distributions of inventor characteristics.
Comparing Possible Modes of Inventor Behavior
The Findings of risk-averse, profit-seeking behavior therefore reject the risk-seeking first view, as well as the second and third views, as predominant modes of inventor behavior.
Data on Inventions and Their Commercialization
The Canadian Innovation Centre ( clippings and other sources suggested the invention might have reached the market, and the survey confirmed this conclusion. We use an econometric technique that corrects for this oversampling on the dependent variable (Manski and Lerman, 1977) .
Precise dates of entry and exit (month and year) were recorded for commercialized inventions. Entry was defined as the start of sales of a product embodying an invention. Among the 101 inventions that reached commercial entry, 24 were soon licensed or otherwise used as revenue sources for generally modest sums with the inventor leaving the market, while the remaining 77 inventions had market survival times equal to the exit date minus entry date. We analyze exit times among the 77 remaining inventions. Exit times are treated as right-censored if exit had not occurred by the sampling date.
The evaluations of economic variables by the IAP were based on a well-established assessment process. Because assessments occurred before commercialization, 7 they avoid problems pointed out in the psychological literature such as methods bias (Campbell and Fiske, 1959) and hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1975 
Empirical Evidence

The Inventors and Their Inventions
The inventors and inventions in our sample are typical of serious independent inventors.
Inventors' characteristics can be assessed using data on 471 of our 1,012 inventors, those that the IAP assessed in 1994-2001, since relevant questions were added in our second survey wave. The inventors' characteristics are summarized in Table 2 . The inventors averaged 28 years' work experience and 9 years' business ownership experience. A majority, 53%, had been business managers, 64% had been business owners, 34% had owned at least two (up to ten) businesses, and 58% had siblings or parents who had owned their own business. Their education was slightly higher than average for people of their ages, with 88% having a high school degree, 42%
having graduated from a four-year university, and 10% having one or more graduate degrees.
They had often worked in multiple occupations, consistent with Lazear (2004) : 73% had worked in at least three occupations, and 33% in at least six occupations. They averaged eight years' inventive experience; only for 26% was the invention their first, 17% had at least ten total inventions, and 1.3% claimed hundreds or thousands of inventions. A plurality of their inventions was consumer-oriented (47%), including inventions for household and general consumer use (28%) and sports and leisure applications (15%).
The IAP's assessments of the inventions, along with the entry outcome, are described in Correlations between entry and the remaining variables are in the hypothesized directions, with the negative correlations between entry and development uncertainty, and between entry and demand uncertainty, suggestive of risk aversion on the part of inventors. The determinants of entry are better probed, however, in a multivariate analysis.
Entry
Inventions that were and were not commercialized are compared in Table 4 . The table presents means and standard deviations of the economic traits for the 911 inventions that were not commercialized and the 101 inventions that were commercialized. Entrants on average had been rated to have lower investment and tooling costs, greater potential sales, lower manufacturing cost, less competition, and lower development uncertainty than non-entrants. The differences in mean traits, reported in the final column of Table 4 , are all statistically significant.
The only variable with a small and insignificant difference is demand uncertainty, consistent with the option to exit counteracting the dissuasion of demand risk.
To assess the joint determinants of commercial entry, we compute maximum likelihood estimates for the logistic regression model. The estimates are adjusted for oversampling on the dependent variable Y using the method of prior correction (Manski and Lerman, 1977) . This The estimated coefficients for ex ante assessments of economic costs and benefits are presented in Table 5 . The full model estimates, in column (1) of the table, largely coincide with the model's characterization of profit-seeking and risk-averse inventor behavior. Potential sales has the largest estimated effect. An improvement from a rating of 0 to 1 in potential sales increases the estimated probability of entry, when other variables are at their means (as always below), from 6.8% to 14.1%. Increased manufacturing cost or competition from imitators, again from 0 to 1, decreases the estimated probability of entry from 5.0% to 2.8%, or 5.0% to 3.5%, respectively. Development uncertainty deters entry, consistent with risk aversion on the part of inventors. Increased development uncertainty, from 0 to 1, decreases the estimated probability of entry from 5.1% to 2.8%. Demand uncertainty's estimated coefficient has the opposite sign from development uncertainty and is near zero, consistent with the option to exit enhancing the expected benefits of demand risk. Potential sales, manufacturing cost, competition, and development uncertainty all have estimated effects that are statistically significant. Size of investment and tooling cost have coefficient estimates closer to zero and statistically insignificant; limited statistical power makes it difficult to know whether their effects are negative as pecuniary motives imply. The two sunk cost measures are the most highly correlated independent variables, and we report estimates in columns (2) and (3) with only one of these measures at a time. In both cases the measures have negative coefficient estimates, fairly near zero relative to their standard errors, and other coefficient estimates change little. Controlling for changes in Canadian gross domestic product (GDP), from two years in the past to two years in the future, has little effect on the estimates as shown in column (4). To the extent there is sufficient statistical power to put clear signs on the estimates, the findings universally confirm the hypothesized patterns for profit-seeking risk-averse inventors. 
Exit
We probe the causes of exit despite at least four reasons why the true effects of economic characteristics should be difficult to observe among rational profit-seeking inventors: forecasts versus realizations, self-selected measurement errors, statistical leverage reduction, and sample size. Forecasts by inventors and their financiers are the only information they have to decide whether to enter, while realized values that are notoriously hard to predict ultimately determine profitability and hence exit, so a priori economic measures should influence entry more than exit. Measurement errors in a priori assessments are compounded by self-selection to enter, because inventions independently assessed as having poor prospects will only be commercialized if the assessments were wrong and the true prospects (as assessed by the inventors) meet at least the minimum standard of commercialized inventions; this biases coefficients toward zero (simulations show that mismeasurement of a single variable might easily bias its coefficient estimates downward by a factor of four while other coefficient estimates fall by a factor of two).
Statistical leverage, the variability in independent variables that facilitates estimation, falls as self-selection weeds out unattractive values of the independent variables, increasing standard errors (by, simulations suggest, about 10% to 30%). Sample size severely limits statistical power because only 77 of the 1,012 inventions were commercialized and have useable data on survival times; this reduction in sample size increases standard errors (by roughly a multiple of 1012 / 77 3.6  ).
Despite these biases toward zero and losses of statistical power, it is interesting to probe for signs of pecuniary motives in the exit patterns. Causes of exit were probed using statistical survival analysis with, alternatively, the exponential and Weibull models. 9 The Weibull model allows for a time-varying exit probability. The exit time for inventors still producing at the time of data collection is treated as right-censored.
Maximum likelihood estimates of both models are shown in Table 6 . The variables are equally scaled with comparable standard deviations, so the magnitudes of the coefficients speak directly to their relative importance. Nearly identical estimates result regardless which survival function is imposed, and virtually the same results arise using other common formulae or Cox's nonparametric model. 10 Correcting for right censoring the estimated mean probability of exit is 0.10 per year, implying an average survival time of 10 years.
The estimates concur with the profit-seeking and risk-averse economic model. Expected competition triples the estimated yearly exit rate if the competition measure rises from 0 to 1, and is the only statistically significant variable. The evidence provides modest further empirical support for pecuniary motives in inventor behavior.
Reasons for Entry and Exit
To further probe inventors' decisions, we collected responses stating why inventors did not enter or why they exited the market. Responses for entry decisions are available only for inventors who did not enter, and responses for exit decisions are available only for inventors who exited by the time of survey. Respondents could state multiple reasons. The data provide a secondary means to assess how often profit-driven behavior causes entry and exit and to confirm the earlier estimation results.
In Table 7 , the top panel reports the percentage of inventors who stated each reason for choosing not to enter. The most common reason was that the IAP recommended that the inventor abandon further efforts (42%), confirming that inventors took the IAP's assessments seriously. Lack of capital made up 32% of reasons, a pre-existing similar product 22%, continuing development 18%, followed by many other reasons around or below 10%. Among the non-pecuniary reasons it is notable that 27% of the inventors abandoned their efforts because, they indicated, they lacked knowledge on how to commercialize their invention. The few other non-pecuniary reasons were less frequent, below 10%.
We further analyzed reasons for non-entry stratified by the IAP's summary recommendations to stop versus go forward with commercialization, indicated in Table 7 by the headings Stop and Go. The distribution of reasons was similar in the two cases, but some differences arose. Lack of capital was a more frequent problem for those recommended to go forward (39%) versus those recommended to stop (30%), a difference significant at the .01 level using Fisher's exact test, possibly signaling capital market failures. The lack of a buyer for intellectual property was blamed for non-entry in 14% of cases among inventions recommended by the IAP compared to only 7% among inventions not recommended by the IAP, a difference significant at the .01 level. Inventors recommended to go ahead with commercialization more often (7% versus 4%) discontinued their activities because of better opportunities elsewhere (difference significant at the .06 level), suggesting that inventor ability yields work opportunities.
Among the non-pecuniary reasons an unwillingness to commercialize was more common for inventors recommended to go ahead (10%) versus stop (5%) (difference significant at the .07 level). All such differences may have arisen endogenously; for example, reported difficulties finding capital and selling intellectual property may have arisen because inventors of higherrated inventions more actively searched for capital and buyers of intellectual property.
The bottom panel similarly catalogues reasons for exit. The dominant reason associated with exit was low sales volume (31%), followed by lack of capital (23%) and high opportunity costs (14%). The two most frequent non-pecuniary reasons for exit are family or personal reasons (12%) and loss of interest (also 12%). Hence, again, pecuniary motives seem to dominate inventors' decision making.
Conclusion
Our theory and empirical results address a current debate regarding whether entrepreneurs are economically rational. Accumulating evidence suggests that there is excess entrepreneurial entry and that this excess entry is driven by non-pecuniary considerations such as greater autonomy, broader skill utilization, and the possibility to pursue one's own ideas (Åstebro and Thompson, 2007; Benz and Frey, 2008; Benz, 2009) . If pervasive, such evidence may question the use of policies to encourage investment in innovation by inventors. We extend the study of entrepreneurial decisions to both entry and exit, characterize how both would be influenced rationally by pecuniary motives, and investigate how entrepreneurs actually respond to financial characteristics of real inventions. The findings do not rule out imperfect rationality and non-financial motives on the part of entrepreneurs. However, the findings confirm that profit-seeking motives and risk aversion substantially drive the entry decisions, and perhaps also exit decisions, of inventor-entrepreneurs.
These findings do not rule out irrationality on the part of inventors. Indeed, Åstebro, Jeffrey, and Adomdza (2007) confirm significant effects of optimism in entry decisions in a subgroup of the inventors studied here. However, pecuniary variables and risk seem to have effects independent of these psychological traits. Hence our findings are consistent with previous literature showing decision making biases among entrepreneurs. Our evidence does imply, however, that overconfidence in high-risk situations is not a predominant behavior.
While some biases and aberrations to profit-seeking behavior indeed affect the decision to commercialize inventions, economics (risk aversion and the search for profit) apparently still matter when it comes to commercializing inventions.
The evidence confirms that positive monetary incentives should enhance commercialization of inventions, although current evidence is insufficient to draw more detailed policy implications. Motivating inventors to invent by for example tax write-offs or direct grants to research may be socially optimal, but the level at which these incentives should be provided is unclear. Studies have not yet analyzed social welfare effects of decision-making biases in innovation. It is clear from Åstebro (2003) that the average entering inventor may not be better off and that the extra entrants tend to be of lower quality with such incentives, but society as a whole may still benefit. Inventors do respond to economic incentives, which is comforting news for policy makers.
Appendix: Technical Assumptions of the Model
The model focuses on inventors for whom the price-cost margin is positive, 0 The time when the inventor has finally ascertained i Q is denoted
t , and is defined such
is the fraction of the discounted profit flow up to this time. The alternate revenue flow i  (or equivalent contributions to utility) is defined such that it yields discounted
12,13 Inventor i's utility function is denoted as ( ) i U  , which is strictly increasing, differentiable, and bounded. The inventor therefore enters if and only if
The inventor thus considers the opportunity for exit in determining whether to enter.
Outcomes in the population of inventors depend on the distribution of traits. Let ( , , , , , , , , , , , , , ƒ ( ), ƒ ( ), ( ))
denote the parameter vector for each inventor. 14 The parameter space is assumed to be convex, and non-degenerate in that even given certain data-driven parameter values all entry and exit outcomes are possible. 15 The distributions of i  , i T  , and i  are assumed to yield a finite probability density function for 
 , and i  are assumed to be distributed independently (or in practice they could be analyzed using proper controls in statistical analyses). Parameters i  , i T  , and i  are assumed to be (jointly) distributed independently of other parameters.
Notes
1 Our results extend to very general functional forms robust to alternative competitive models.
The term i  in the profit equation can be replaced with a differentiable function ( ; , , , ) 
more R&D is completed would tend to inhibit exit during development, maintaining the distinction derived here between development uncertainty versus demand uncertainty.
5 Rate of exit, which is a function of time since entry, is the probability of exit per unit of time for a randomly-selected inventor who has entered but not yet exited. The definition is identical to that used in statistical survival analysis.
6 For further descriptions see Udell (1989) , Udell et al. (1993) , and Åstebro and Gerchak (2001) .
7 Average time between evaluation and market launch was approximately two years (Åstebro, 2003) . R&D expenses for inventions that later reached the market averaged Cdn. $255,370, but R&D expenses for the same inventions up to the date of evaluation had averaged only Cdn. $87,850 (2003 values) . 8 These results appear to be robust to a range of controls for inventor ability and psychological characteristics. Data on inventor ability and psychological characteristics are available for the subset of the data collected in our second survey wave, and we re-estimated the entry models using this subset of the data with and without controls for ability and psychological characteristics. Although standard errors are substantially larger given the limited sample size, it is informative that the point estimates for our pecuniary and risk variables changed little between models with and without these controls, using the same observations each time. With controls for managerial experience, log (one plus) years of business ownership experience, log (one plus) number of businesses owned, whether other family members operated a business, log (one plus) years of work experience, log number of occupational fields of experience, high school education, college education, graduate education, log (one plus) number of degrees, log (one plus) years of inventive experience, and log number of inventions, or various subsets of these variables, the point estimates changed fairly little (diminishing 49% for tooling cost, at most 31% for other estimates, and on average 26%). With controls for optimism, overconfidence, risk aversion, and enjoyment of inventing, the point estimates changed even less (diminishing at most 17% and on average 4%). With both sets of controls used simultaneously, changes in point estimates were also limited (diminishing 58% for tooling cost, at most 46% for other estimates, and on average 23%). In each model, the full set of variables is highly jointly statistically significant, as are the economic (pecuniary and risk) variables as a set, and as are the inventor abilities as a set. The psychological variables in contrast are never jointly significant at the p<.10
level. In all cases, although the large standard errors make almost all estimates statistically insignificant, the estimates had the same signs as those presented in Table 5 . 9 The hazard of exit for a surviving business is exp( )
The estimate of the time-related parameter, ln( ) p , in the Weibull model implies that the probability of exit falls from 0.087 in the first year to 0.065 in the eighth year, for a commercialized invention with mean characteristics.
11 A special case is 13 This implies ln(1 ) Note.-Significance levels for differences in means use two-tailed t-tests. Based on 911 nonentrant and 101 entrant observations. * Statistically significant at the 10% level. ** Statistically significant at the 5% level. *** Statistically significant at the 1% level. -Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses (based on 250,000 bootstrap replications). Constant is prior corrected. Based on 1,012 observations. * Statistically significant at the 10% level. ** Statistically significant at the 5% level. *** Statistically significant at the 1% level. Note.-Multiple reasons can be given, so columns do not total to 100%. Base number of responses to each question varies between 641 and 1,363. The Fisher's exact test column reports the p-value for rejection of the null hypothesis that inventors in the Stop and Go categories had the same probability of stating a given reason for non-entry.
